Water scarcity in the Middle East: Issue of global importance and transforming conflicts

The Middle East is currently experiencing security, climate change, and water scarcity challenges all at the same time. In the Middle East, water shortage is a significant environmental issue that is quickly becoming a source of conflict in an already volatile region. Annual internal water resources in the region account for only 6% of average annual precipitation, compared to a global average of 38%.

Although it has around 6% of the world's population, it only possesses 1% of the world's freshwater resources. Nearly two-thirds of the population of the region lives in areas with insufficient renewable water resources, and over 60% of the population lives in areas with high surface water stress, compared to a global average of roughly 35%.

Meanwhile, approximately 70% of economic activity in the Middle East takes place in places with high or very high water stress, more than three times the global average of 22%. Despite recent breakthroughs in water delivery technology and management, the region's finite water resources are being overexploited due to extreme scarcity, weak governance, changing hydrology, and rising demands in many industries. Subsidies that are too high stifle incentives for smart water management.

Although the Middle East has abundant transboundary freshwater resources, the absence of mutual agreement on water allocation in shared rivers and aquifers adds to the region's water scarcity situation's complexity and potential conflict. Freshwater from the region's major transboundary rivers — the Tigris-Euphrates, the Nile, and the Jordan — is used in unsustainable quantities for agricultural, industrial, and domestic reasons. Most water policy efforts, on the other hand, are oriented towards boosting access through increased aquifer exploitation or saltwater desalination, rather than conserving water and guaranteeing efficient management.

The rising water scarcity situation jeopardizes human security and adds to variables that heighten the risk of violence, fragility, and war, resulting in insecurity and displacement across the Middle East. Failed governments, political instability, forced displacement, armed wars, and persistent insecurity characterize Middle East geopolitics as a conflict-ridden regional system.

In the last few decades, the region's potential sources of instability have grown and varied significantly. Aside from conventional origins of conflict, socioeconomic and environmental challenges are increasingly contributing to the onset and perpetuation of war in the volatile Middle East. Water shortage, along with tremendous population increase and urbanization, is the most pressing environmental concern in the Middle East, and it is gradually becoming a source of conflict in an already unstable region, as trends in the region show.

Water, as a strategic asset, is no longer only tied to environmental concerns and food security, but also to regional security arrangements. Water is seen as a source of political influence and power by states. In the Middle East, water is a source of state power, and scarcity is inextricably linked to national security. Many scholars have observed that disputes over transboundary waterways cannot be understood without first comprehending power dynamics and the significance of competing or warring states' upstream-downstream orientation.

Although power imbalance has historically been the main cause for the lack of battles in transboundary waterways, it is also a major impediment to the basin adopting shared measures and cooperative procedures for managing water scarcity. Asymmetric allocation of transboundary freshwater results from the significant power imbalance among riparian governments, and the absence of war does not imply the absence of conflict in the basin.

According to the hydro-hegemony framework — an analytical framework for studying how hegemony and power asymmetries influence transboundary water politics — relative power imbalance in the basin inevitably leads to hydro-hegemony, in which a superior power controls water flows and forces weaker states to follow its orders. The hegemon has asymmetric power to coerce a weaker state, and he sets the agenda for all riparian states in the river basin.

Aside from physical location, the framework implies that the use of force and consent in conjunction with the implementation of basin-wide regulations is a more powerful determinant than international legislation on non-navigational usage of international watercourses or riparian position. Upstream hegemons use water to gain more power, while downstream hegemons use power to gain more water — Turkey is an upstream hegemon, Ethiopia is an upstream state but not a hegemon, and Egypt is a downstream hegemon. In this scenario, the powerful riparian has exploited international water law to express their dominance and to compel compliance.

Cooperation is least likely to occur in asymmetric conditions, such as when the upstream state is the basin's hegemon. When the downstream state is the hegemon of the basin, collaboration is more likely, but the agreement is frequently imposed in exchange for the stronger riparian's benefits. Turkey's strategic location and hydro-hegemony on the Euphrates and Tigris, and Israel's hydro-hegemony on the Jordan River, for example, allow both countries to maintain dominance over Syria and Iraq, and Palestine, respectively. Although basin governments' power relations evolve through coexisting, conflictual, and cooperative interactions, effective transboundary water management that promotes collaboration is difficult to achieve.

The hydro-hegemon dictates the method of cooperative adaptation to the weaker riparian in a coercive engagement in the setting of unequal power in the basin, where water governance is applied since water is considered as a public good. The weak downstream riparian states are apparently unable to change the arrangements due to power imbalances over the region's main transboundary rivers, the Tigris, Euphrates, and Jordan, which leaves no room for negotiation and reconciliation while escalating the Middle East's rising water conflict.

Transboundary water agreements are essentially political, and they are shaped by the riparian governments' larger social-security environment. Water supply systems are increasingly becoming both political levers and strategic objectives in the Middle East, which continues to suffer from chronic instability, as states see access to water as a national security problem. As a result, the misdistribution of transboundary freshwater, combined with rising populations and urbanization, the absence of international water legislation, and depleting water resources, show that water is becoming a more important trigger of interstate politics and conflict. War over water is quite likely in semi-arid zones like the Middle East, where the hydro-hegemony is building large dams across common rivers, thereby weaponizing water to fulfil its strategic aims.

In the transboundary basins of the Nile and Jordan, Egypt and Israel have been exploiting current unrest to forward their grandiose ambition of becoming regional hydro-hegemons. Water can be utilized as a determining force in Israel's prolonged occupation of the West Bank, thanks to power asymmetry in the Jordan River basin and technological technology, allowing Israel to grab water resources in Palestine and neighbouring Arab countries. Apart from being utilized as a tool of dominance, water warfare has been the primary cause of conflicts. Water scarcity, drought, and climate change, according to an increasing number of studies, have played a direct part in the deterioration of Syria's socioeconomic conditions, brutal civil conflict, and the formation of extremist armed groups in Iraq and Syria, such as ISIS.

Water scarcity in the Middle East is a global issue that has turned riparian conflict into a major regional and international security concern. Water scarcity is a threat multiplier, and its socioeconomic effects have serious international security implications — aggravating factors can lead to massive displacement and migration flows, pressing concerns about food security, environmental degradation, political instability, social insurgency, state failure, interstate violent conflict, and the reemergence of extremism and terrorism, all of which have the potential to trigger domino effects outside the region.

Multilateral initiatives should be founded on the formation of transboundary water resource management agreements, which can help overcome local political barriers and lead to the adoption of a long-term integrated framework for managing water demand and supply. If current trends continue, this region faces a considerable risk of impending conflicts and wars over water, with far-reaching consequences. Now is the time for the international community to intervene.

Water availability, quality, water treatment options, and water reuse decisions we make today have an impact on the future living standards of communities all over the world. What is going to happen? No one is aware. However, it's critical to think about the options. Talk to our experts and learn more on global water solutions through MEGHDOOT.

Africa, an epicentre of global water scarcity is socially induced- facts to know

Water scarcity is frequently caused by factors other than a physical lack of water. Socially-induced water shortage is a more common cause of people's lack of access in Africa. There are various aspects of water scarcity, including the infrastructural and socio-economic elements that can amplify one another to exclude particular communities.

When we think of water scarcity, we often think of dry rivers, dams, and taps, as well as long lines at water stations. Changes in weather patterns and climatic circumstances, which restrict the supply of pure fresh water, are linked to water shortages. However, physical shortage is not the main reason for water scarcity, which can occur even in areas where freshwater is plentiful. Water scarcity affects the majority of people in Africa as a result of subtle kinds of exclusion based on income position, geographic location, gender, and political affiliation, degree of education, nationality, or race. Poor governance, weak public institutions, and unequal power relations exacerbate this sort of socially-induced water scarcity.

Every day, we hear in the news about the increasing demand on water resources as the world's population grows, as well as the detrimental repercussions of climate change. According to current estimates, the world's population grew 4.4 times from just over 1.6 billion in 1900 to over 7 billion in 2010. While freshwater resources have stayed nearly constant over the same time span, water withdrawal has increased by 7.3 times. According to these projections, there is increasing demand on limited water supplies, which has resulted in water shortages in some cases. In 2016, it was reported that 2.7 billion people face water shortages for at least a month each year, with 70 percent of the world's population expected to face moderate to severe water shortages by 2050.

Although the amount of water removed from the environment per person in Africa is still the lowest in the world, the urban population has been continuously increasing, with some nations seeing rapid growth. Africa's population grew from 613.5 million to 1.21 billion people between 1990 and 2016. According to a recent study, the urban population of Africa expanded from 27 million in 1950 to 567 million in 2015. By 2050, Africa's urban population is predicted to reach over 950 million people, putting greater strain on water resources. Water consumption is expected to climb even faster as living standards and wages improve.

According to the 2016 African Economic Outlook, the number of individuals with improved water sources increased by 232 million between 1990 and 214, but many more people still lack or have restricted access to safe drinking water. Most of these estimates use aggregate national data that do not reflect the reality of the majority of people, particularly in rural and peri-urban areas, who have limited access to water.

Despite the abundance, there are shortages. The remarkable contradiction is that in water-stressed African countries, the proportion of people with access to water is higher. Water-stressed countries in North Africa (especially Algeria, Libya, Egypt, and Mauritania) and Southern Africa (especially Namibia, South Africa, and Botswana) provide water to a higher proportion of people than countries with abundant water resources, such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Mozambique, Angola, Niger, South Sudan, and Tanzania. Despite the fact that Cape Town is located in a low-rainfall area with annual average rainfall of less than 500 millimeters, resulting in low freshwater endowment, the city provides clean water to a much higher proportion of its residents than Kampala, Kinshasa, Lagos, Lomé, Lusaka, or Yaonde, which have better freshwater resources.

As a result, it is clear that the problem of water scarcity cannot be attributed solely to the physical absence of water resources in the natural environment; water shortages can occur even in areas where fresh water is plentiful. Under many African cities and countries with abundant fresh water resources, a large section of the population lives in perpetual water scarcity.

Water scarcity can be caused by a variety of causes other than the quantity of water in the natural environment, so it's vital to break down the many dimensions of the problem, taking into consideration both environmental and socioeconomic variables. A disaggregated view of water constraint serves to highlight the socio economic nuances that contribute to water scarcity. Examining multiple levels of water scarcity helps to reveal a more complex water story.

Water scarcity dimensions

The inadequacy of water in the natural environment is referred to as first-order water shortage. It emphasizes the fact that accessible water supplies are limited, whether in terms of volume or the fight to fulfil present and future demands. Northern and southern Africa, the Middle East, and areas of Central Asia are all suffering from acute first-order scarcity.

Second-order scarcity frequently refers to a lack of financial resources to ensure that everyone has access to upgraded water sources. Failure to invest in or repair water infrastructure, for example, might result in a community's water supply being limited or unavailable, even while fresh water is plentiful. Even when the colony is near a well-stocked water supply, many people living in informal communities in African towns face water shortages.

Institutional arrangements and mechanisms that mediate access to water for home or non-domestic use are referred to as third-order scarcity. For many individuals, the way institutions are set up and run can create hurdles to accessing water resources. Even in settings where there are ample water supplies and appropriate resources for water infrastructure, third-order scarcities function at a macro level, where some actions or lack thereof lead to some individuals living in conditions of scarcity. It is typical to encounter people in the same city with varying levels of water availability.

In most African cities, for example, people of informal settlements face different types of water scarcity than residents of formal and high-cost districts. Residents in informal and low-income communities struggle to acquire water services in cities like Cape Town, where the average water access ratio implies that just a small percentage of the population lacks basic access to water. As a result of weak infrastructure, they frequently face irregular water supply, slow response times to water problems, and substandard water services.

The fourth-order scarcity emerges due to social ties between distinct groups of people, not because of a lack of water or insufficient infrastructure. Some people struggle to get water because they have no or little money, because they reside in a poor neighbourhood, because they are refugees, foreigners, women, or because the bulk of the community members support a specific political party (typically the opposition), and so on. In this sense, fourth-order scarcity is the most subtle, as it frequently acts at a micro level and, as a result, is often overlooked by public policy.

Although many people in Africa live in areas where first-order scarcity is common, the majority of people live in areas where the other three categories of scarcity (socially induced) are common. These scarcity orders, on the other hand, should not be seen in a hierarchical fashion, in which one order is given priority over the others, because they frequently reinforce each other.

Talk to our experts at Maithri who are not only addressing, but solving global water problems. Read our global stories on - www.maithriaqua.com/newsandblogs